Ahmet Tümer

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations between Turkmenistan and Russia have developed within the framework of a multidimensional strategic cooperation of significant importance. In 1995, Turkmenistan adopted a “permanent neutrality” status recognized by the United Nations and has since tried to maintain a balance among major powers. Russia, for its part, aims to preserve its influence in Central Asia and deepen cooperation with Turkmenistan in the fields of energy, economy, and security.

This report analyzes in detail the diplomatic relations, economic cooperation (especially in the energy sector), security cooperation, and major recent developments between the two countries. Each chapter discusses concrete developments, agreements, joint projects, and the broader international context. The report concludes with an overall assessment and forward-looking scenarios for the future of Turkmenistan–Russia relations.

Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations between Turkmenistan and Russia have followed a fluctuating path since Turkmenistan gained independence in 1991. Under the first President Saparmurat Niyazov, Ashgabat pursued a largely isolated foreign policy based on “positive neutrality.” During this period, in an effort to limit Russian influence, Russian-language schools were closed, Russian was removed from the public sphere, and Turkmenistan downgraded its status in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to “associate member.” Niyazov’s isolationist stance led to a cooling in relations with Moscow.

With the rise to power of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow in 2007, contacts with Moscow were re-energized. In 2017, the two countries signed a “Strategic Partnership Agreement,” institutionalizing political dialogue. Within this framework, an economic cooperation program for 2017–2019 and about 80 joint projects were identified. In the same year, Turkmenistan appointed a permanent representative to the CIS Economic Council, and President Berdimuhamedow’s son, Serdar Berdimuhamedow, became co-chair of the Russian–Turkmen Intergovernmental Commission. Turkmenistan also began to participate as a guest in Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summits and showed interest in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meetings as an observer. These steps show that, while maintaining its policy of multi-vector diplomacy, Ashgabat places importance on close dialogue with Moscow.

After Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow handed over the presidency to his son Serdar Berdimuhamedow in 2022, bilateral relations gained a new momentum. After assuming office in March 2022, President Serdar Berdimuhamedow paid his first official visit abroad to Moscow in June 2022, where the two sides signed the “Declaration on Deepening the Strategic Partnership between Turkmenistan and Russia.” This declaration set out future priorities in political, trade and investment, cultural and humanitarian, and security fields. During the same visit, a further 14 agreements were signed, and President Putin awarded Serdar Berdimuhamedow a Friendship Medal for his contribution to bilateral relations. These developments revealed that Turkmenistan’s new leadership also intends to maintain relations with Moscow at a strategic level.

The institutional dimension of diplomatic relations has also been strengthened. In June 2025, during Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Ashgabat, a 2025–2026 Cooperation Program was signed between the two foreign ministries. This program aims to regularize political consultations and maintain close coordination in multilateral platforms such as the UN, the Caspian Five, and the Central Asia+Russia format. Ashgabat and Moscow emphasize that they hold similar positions on regional and global issues. On sensitive issues such as the Ukraine crisis, Turkmenistan has been careful to maintain neutrality and avoid openly criticizing Russia, thereby seeking to keep the political basis of bilateral relations free of major friction.

Diplomatic relations are also reinforced in the cultural and humanitarian dimension. After declining in the post-Soviet period, Russian cultural influence has once again become visible in Turkmenistan in recent years. Currently, there are 71 schools in Turkmenistan where Russian is the language of instruction. Russia is also taking significant steps to win over Turkmen youth. For example, during his 2025 visit, Foreign Minister Lavrov proposed the establishment of a joint Russian–Turkmen university and the expansion of exchange programs for young diplomats and students. These initiatives reflect Moscow’s desire to preserve and expand its cultural influence in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen side has responded positively to such projects, aiming to strengthen ties of friendship with Russia at the societal level.

Despite these developments, Turkmenistan continues to pursue a policy of avoiding multilateral alliances that might restrict its sovereignty. Ashgabat is determined not to join Russia-centered integration projects such as the EAEU or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This stance is part of Turkmenistan’s strategy to preserve its independent foreign policy and principle of neutrality. For example, Ashgabat considers that EAEU membership would reduce its room for maneuver and instead explores more flexible forms of cooperation, such as observer status or limited sectoral partnerships. In sum, diplomatic relations are developing on the basis of mutual respect and strategic partnership, while Turkmenistan carefully protects its own foreign policy line.

Note: A table listing the major agreements signed between the two countries (with date, subject, and scope) could be prepared to visually present the milestones in diplomatic relations.

Economic Cooperation and the Energy Sector

Economic relations between Turkmenistan and Russia have been shaped predominantly around the energy sector and have witnessed notable developments in recent years. Turkmenistan, which possesses the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, is a key actor in energy exports. For many years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkmen gas reached world markets primarily via Russia; this made Gazprom–Turkmengaz cooperation the backbone of bilateral relations.

However, tensions emerged between the parties in the 2000s. In April 2009, an explosion on the Central Asia–Center pipeline, which carried natural gas from Turkmenistan to Russia, led to mutual accusations and brought planned new pipeline projects to a halt. After this event, economic and political contacts were reduced to a minimum. In 2016, Gazprom completely stopped importing gas from Turkmenistan and took Turkmenistan to international arbitration due to a pricing dispute. This period represented the low point in bilateral relations. While China emerged as Turkmenistan’s sole buyer of natural gas, even large-volume sales to Beijing failed to generate the desired revenue because loans were being repaid with gas deliveries.

The year 2019 marked the beginning of renewed rapprochement in energy cooperation. Gazprom withdrew its legal claims against Turkmenistan and signed a five-year gas purchase agreement, under which it resumed imports of Turkmen gas in 2019 at a volume of 5.5 billion cubic meters per year. Although the volumes were far below previous levels and prices were less favorable for Turkmenistan, the agreement provided Ashgabat with a critical cash flow and somewhat strengthened its hand vis-à-vis China. With Gazprom’s resumption of gas purchases, Turkmenistan obtained some relief from its economic crisis and gained leverage against Beijing, which had been its sole buyer.

Another dimension of recent energy cooperation has been the discussion of new pipeline routes and corridors. Turkmenistan has long sought to diversify its energy export routes and has promoted several initiatives. The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline project is one of the most prominent. The Taliban’s seizure of power in Afghanistan in 2021 raised uncertainty about the project’s future, but Ashgabat has tried to advance TAPI by maintaining cordial relations with the Taliban.

At the same time, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which would transport Turkmen gas to Turkey and Europe via Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea, has remained on the international energy agenda. In 2021, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan resolved their long-standing dispute over the Dostluk (Friendship) hydrocarbon field and agreed to jointly develop it. Russia’s Lukoil announced its willingness to become the operator of this project. Moscow welcomed this development because Russian involvement in regional energy projects helps it maintain its geopolitical influence. Nevertheless, Russia has generally been reluctant toward the idea of Caspian routes for gas exports to Europe. The 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea requires the consent of littoral states for sub-sea pipelines; invoking environmental concerns, Moscow has sought to keep tight control over Turkmenistan’s access to Western markets.

In recent years, non-energy economic cooperation has also expanded significantly. Notably, there have been sharp increases in trade volume since 2020. Despite the global slowdown caused by the pandemic, non-gas trade between the two countries rose by 40% in 2020, reaching 970 million USD. In 2021, total trade amounted to around 865 million USD, while in 2022 bilateral trade volumes jumped to about 1.6 billion USD. Growth continued in 2023, and for 2024 the trade volume is estimated to be close to 1.8 billion USD. In the first months of 2025, trade posted an additional increase of about 58% compared to the same period of the previous year, indicating an exceptional surge. These figures show that economic ties between Turkmenistan and Russia are strengthening and diversifying beyond the energy sector. As of 2022, Russia had become one of Turkmenistan’s top three trading partners.

Note: A line chart showing the trajectory of Turkmenistan–Russia trade volumes from 2017 to 2025 would be useful to visualize the evolution of economic cooperation over time.

In terms of trade structure, Turkmenistan imports capital goods, machinery and equipment, metal products, foodstuffs, and consumer goods from Russia, while Russia imports from Turkmenistan some natural gas (during 2019–2023 under the agreed volumes), as well as petroleum products, chemicals, and textile products. Due to the limited range of Turkmen exports, the trade balance tends to favor Russia, with Turkmenistan incurring a trade deficit vis-à-vis its northern neighbor. This reveals that Turkmenistan’s economy still relies heavily on hydrocarbon revenues and has not sufficiently diversified.

A further dimension of economic cooperation lies in the relations between Turkmenistan and Russian regional actors. In particular, the Republic of Tatarstan maintains close economic ties with Turkmenistan. Tatarstan’s oil company Tatneft has been active in Turkmenistan’s oil fields since 2008, and in 2020 it signed a service agreement with the state-owned Turkmennebit to improve the productivity of oil wells until 2028. Similarly, Tatarstan-based KAMAZ delivered about 2,000 vehicles to Turkmenistan between 2019 and 2021 and is expanding its maintenance and service network in the country. The Kazan Helicopter Plant has supplied air ambulances for Turkmen medical aviation, while Ak Bars Shipyard has played a role in modernizing Turkmenistan’s fleet, delivering a passenger vessel and constructing additional ships. Such comprehensive sub-national cooperation is part of Moscow’s strategy to strengthen ties with Turkmenistan at multiple levels. Regions such as Tatarstan, with their cultural affinity (Turkic language, Islam) and industrial strength, help Russia balance Chinese and Western influence in Turkmenistan.

Beyond energy, investments and projects in other sectors are also noteworthy. Leveraging its geographic location, Turkmenistan seeks to become a key node in regional transport corridors. Together with Russia, Turkmenistan is working on the North–South Transport Corridor, which connects Russia to the Indian Ocean via Iran. In this context, effective use of Turkmenistan’s Turkmenbashi port on the Caspian Sea and capacity increases on the Russia–Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway lines are on the agenda. During Lavrov’s 2025 visit, attention was drawn to Turkmenistan’s position at the intersection of East–West and North–South corridors, and its potential role in the Middle Corridor linking China, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. These projects are in line with Turkmenistan’s ambition to become a logistics hub in international trade, and by supporting these efforts, Russia both derives economic benefits and helps preserve its regional influence.

In summary, today’s economic cooperation rests on two main pillars:

• Partnerships in the energy sector
• Trade and investment projects beyond energy

In energy, Russia acts both as a buyer and a transit country for Turkmen gas, but the rising share of China in recent years and Turkmenistan’s search for alternative markets complicate the picture. Notably, in 2024 Russia overtook Turkmenistan as China’s largest gas supplier. This development, linked to Moscow redirecting its gas toward China, exposes Turkmenistan to increased competition in the Chinese market.

For its part, Turkmenistan has experimented with swap deals via Iran to send gas to Turkey and Azerbaijan and, indirectly, to Europe. In March 2023, a tripartite swap mechanism was launched, whereby Turkmen gas was transported via Iran to Turkey and from there to Europe for the first time. This new route attracted international attention and shows that Turkmenistan is exploring options beyond Russia and China, pursuing a multi-vector strategy in energy exports.

Security Cooperation

Security and military cooperation constitute the most cautious and limited dimension of Turkmenistan–Russia relations. Under its permanent neutrality doctrine, Turkmenistan has pursued an inward-looking, alliance-free security policy since independence. As a result, it is the Central Asian country that has the least extensive security partnership with Russia. Ashgabat has systematically rejected participation in Russia-centered security platforms such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and has generally refrained from participating even as an observer in joint military exercises. For instance, while Uzbekistan — despite not being a CSTO member — occasionally participates in military drills with Russia, Turkmenistan prefers to stay apart from such activities. This shows Turkmenistan’s desire to retain unilateral decision-making autonomy in security matters while accepting the risks of relying predominantly on its own capabilities.

Historically, Turkmenistan had a form of security guarantee arrangement with Russia in the early years of independence. Under an agreement signed in July 1992, Russia undertook to act as a guarantor of Turkmenistan’s security, allowing Ashgabat to postpone the immediate need to build its own armed forces. During the 1990s, some segments of Turkmenistan’s borders were guarded by Russian border troops under this arrangement. From the 2000s onwards, however, Turkmenistan focused on strengthening its own armed forces, especially to protect its interests in the Caspian Sea. After 2010, Ashgabat began building a navy as part of this effort. The naval base inaugurated in 2021 at Garshi (Turkmenbashi) and the acquisition of new vessels were important steps in enhancing Turkmenistan’s defense capabilities. In this military modernization process, Russia did not act as Turkmenistan’s primary supplier of major weapon systems. Instead, Ashgabat procured defense equipment from a range of sources (Turkey, China, Western countries). According to expert assessments, Turkmenistan has significantly reduced its dependence on Russian weaponry and diversified its arsenal.

By the late 2010s, regional security dynamics compelled Turkmenistan to take some selective cooperation steps. In particular, there was intensified dialogue between Moscow and Ashgabat regarding threats emanating from Afghanistan. With the revival of bilateral relations after 2017, Russia encouraged Turkmenistan to take more concrete steps in security cooperation. These efforts culminated in the signing of a “Joint Security Cooperation Agreement” in October 2020. This was significant as it represented the first comprehensive agreement in the security field in 17 years (the previous similar agreement dated back to 2003). The timing of the agreement is noteworthy; many observers argue that Russia used its economic leverage to persuade Turkmenistan to sign. While Turkmenistan continues to publicly assert that its borders are secure, independent sources report incidents of clashes and incursions along the Afghan border. In 2020, reports emerged claiming that Russian troops had covertly supported Turkmen units along the Afghan frontier, but Ashgabat officially denied these claims on the grounds that they contradicted its foreign policy principles.

Turkmenistan and Russia share a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan. Both countries have expressed support for a diplomatic, inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan following the rise of the Taliban. Before the fall of Kabul, they maintained contacts with both the Afghan government and the Taliban, seeing the latter as a necessary part of the solution. After the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, Turkmenistan and Russia continued to coordinate on humanitarian aid and infrastructure projects. For its own economic benefit, Turkmenistan has placed particular emphasis on maintaining good relations with the Taliban to advance the TAPI project and has consulted Moscow on these matters.

However, there are subtle differences in the strategic objectives of the two countries in Afghanistan. Russia has seen the post-Taliban security vacuum as an opportunity to enhance its influence in Central Asia and to consolidate the regional security architecture under its leadership. Turkmenistan, on the other hand, has focused on being affected as little as possible by these developments while preserving its neutral identity. While Moscow would like to pull Turkmenistan more firmly into its security orbit (for example by encouraging CSTO observer status or participation in joint exercises), Ashgabat prefers informal and bilateral cooperation and continues to avoid formal alliances. At this point, China also enters the equation: in recent years, China has become more visible in the security sphere in Central Asia by providing equipment and even establishing facilities. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Ashgabat as his first stop on a Central Asia tour in July 2021 and offered Chinese support for Turkmenistan’s border security, this was particularly significant. Turkmenistan welcomed this proposal and took steps to allow Chinese private security companies to protect Chinese investments on its territory. Ashgabat thus seeks to strengthen its hand by obtaining support from another major power like China before deepening security cooperation with Russia, thereby avoiding excessive dependence on Moscow and pursuing a fine balance between the two.

In the context of regional security, the status and security of the Caspian Sea are also important issues. In August 2018, the five littoral states (including Turkmenistan and Russia) signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, ending years of uncertainty. The convention primarily addresses the division of the seabed and the principle of preventing military presence by external powers. In October 2024, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan signed a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement on naval cooperation in the Caspian, emphasizing the rejection of foreign intervention in the region.

Notably, Turkmenistan did not participate in this meeting. Ashgabat likely preferred to stay out of this multilateral maritime security initiative because it saw it as incompatible with its neutrality or not fully aligned with its own interests. Russia, which has the strongest navy in the Caspian, opposes permanent deployments by outside actors such as the US and NATO, and views the Caspian as an area where only littoral states should be influential. Turkmenistan, however, adopts a more cautious and reserved approach and may be reluctant to fully endorse a vision of the Caspian controlled solely by the littoral states under Russia’s leadership. This example is consistent with Turkmenistan’s reflex of staying away from binding multilateral security arrangements.

In conclusion, Turkmenistan–Russia security cooperation is a controlled and limited partnership. While Moscow would like to integrate Ashgabat more deeply into its security architecture, Turkmenistan prefers to maintain cooperation in less visible forms such as shadow support or bilateral intelligence sharing. Security dialogue is not absent: intelligence is exchanged on such issues as terrorism, border security, and drug trafficking, and Turkmen officers occasionally receive training in Russian military institutions. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan neither joins Russian-led alliances nor participates in joint military operations. This carefully calibrated distance allows Turkmenistan to address its security concerns while preserving its image of neutrality.

Key Recent Developments (Post-2020)

In the period after 2020, Turkmenistan–Russia relations have seen significant developments in the diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions. The main developments can be summarized chronologically as follows:

2020

• A historic step was taken in the security dimension, which had long remained underdeveloped, when Turkmenistan and Russia signed a Joint Security Cooperation Agreement. This was the first comprehensive agreement in the security field since 2003.
• Allegations surfaced that Russian troops were secretly supporting Turkmen forces on the Afghan border, but Ashgabat officially denied these claims, stating they were incompatible with its foreign policy principles.
• Despite the pandemic, bilateral trade increased by 40% and reached a record level, indicating a trend toward diversification in economic relations.

2021

• To deepen economic cooperation, Turkmenistan approved the 2021–2023 Russia–Turkmenistan Economic Cooperation Program. This program envisaged new joint projects in many sectors including industry, agriculture, finance, and energy.
• Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan reached an agreement to jointly develop the Dostluk oil and gas field, marking an important step toward diversifying Turkmenistan’s energy exports. Russia welcomed the agreement and Lukoil declared its readiness to participate in the project.
• The visit of the Chinese foreign minister to Ashgabat was seen as a move by Turkmenistan to draw closer to China in the energy and security spheres, a development that Moscow has taken into account in shaping its Turkmenistan policy.

2022

• In March 2022, Serdar Berdimuhamedow became president, marking a leadership change in Turkmenistan. His first official foreign visit was to Moscow in June 2022, where the parties signed the Declaration on Deepening the Strategic Partnership between Turkmenistan and Russia.
• Fourteen new agreements were signed during the visit, expanding cooperation in trade, investment, culture, and security.
• Ashgabat hosted the 6th Caspian Summit, which Russian President Putin attended. The summit focused on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and cooperation there.
• Turkmenistan participated in the first summit of the Central Asia+Russia format, indicating a more active role in multilateral regional diplomacy.

2023

• Trade continued to grow, and by the end of the year, bilateral trade volumes were expected to reach the 1.7–1.8 billion USD range.
• The Russian ambassador in Ashgabat underlined the strength of cultural relations, noting that 71 schools with Russian as the language of instruction were operating in Turkmenistan, marking a renewed spread of the Russian language.
• President Serdar Berdimuhamedow and President Vladimir Putin held a phone conversation to discuss bilateral ties and cooperation, and later Berdimuhamedow attended the informal CIS leaders’ summit in St. Petersburg.
• Turkmenistan gave signs of a modest opening toward the West. In March 2023, for the first time, Turkmen gas reached Europe via Iran and Turkey under a swap arrangement, at a time when US and EU interest in Turkmenistan was rising due to energy security concerns.

2024

• At the beginning of the year, the five-year gas purchase agreement signed between Gazprom and Turkmenistan in 2019 expired and was not renewed. Accordingly, Gazprom stopped planned gas purchases from Turkmenistan from 2024 onward.
• By significantly boosting gas exports to China, Russia surpassed Turkmenistan and became China’s largest gas supplier, forcing Ashgabat to rethink its export strategy.
• Turkmenistan signed an agreement with Uzbekistan to set up a joint free trade zone in the border region, taking a step toward regional economic integration.
• Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Iran signed a document on enhanced security cooperation in the Caspian Sea, but Turkmenistan did not participate, highlighting Ashgabat’s distance from multilateral security understandings.
• Turkmenistan began negotiating a new version of the economic cooperation program with Russia to cover the period after 2024, likely specifying a fresh list of joint projects for 2025–2027.

2025

• In June 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov paid an official visit to Ashgabat. During his talks with President Serdar Berdimuhamedow and Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, they discussed the acceleration of economic and humanitarian projects, the follow-up of joint projects under the intergovernmental commission, and regional security issues.
• As a result of the visit, the two foreign ministries signed the 2025–2026 Cooperation Program, stressing close coordination within the CIS, the Caspian Five, the Central Asia+Russia format, and the UN.
• Lavrov publicly announced the plan to establish a Russian–Turkmen university in Ashgabat and to expand youth exchanges, a concrete manifestation of Russia’s effort to broaden its cultural influence.
• The United States’ growing diplomatic interest in Turkmenistan drew attention. US officials held contacts with Turkmen counterparts, praising Turkmenistan for facilitating certain evacuation and transit operations during regional crises and expressing the desire to enhance commercial ties.
• Russian media speculated that a new long-runway airport opened in the town of Jebel in western Turkmenistan might be used by US military transport planes, causing unease in Moscow. These developments show that, as of 2025, Turkmenistan has become the object of an intensifying competition for influence between Russia and the West.

Overall Assessment and Future Prospects

Although Turkmenistan–Russia relations have advanced in recent years to the point where they are labeled a strategic partnership, this rapprochement has not produced a fundamental shift in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy orientation. Ashgabat continues to place its neutrality and balancing strategy at the center of its diplomacy. Despite growing economic and political cooperation with Russia, Turkmenistan remains determined not to join Russian-led multilateral structures such as the EAEU, CSTO, or SCO. Thus, intense bilateral contacts coexist with a cautious stance toward deeper multilateral integration. This reflects Turkmenistan’s overarching strategy of keeping equal distance from major powers (Russia, China, and the United States).

From a perspective of current interests, Moscow and Ashgabat’s priorities converge in many areas. The two countries share similar concerns and goals regarding Afghanistan’s stability and the fight against regional terrorism and drug trafficking. In the economic realm, Turkmenistan wants to reduce its energy dependence on both China and Russia, which drives it toward projects like TAPI and the Trans-Caspian pipeline. Yet, given existing constraints, it is unlikely that these projects will be fully realized in the short term. Consequently, Turkmenistan will continue, at least for the near future, to rely primarily on China in terms of gas exports and on Russia in security matters. This dual dependence forces Ashgabat to pursue a careful balancing policy.

Looking ahead, both domestic and external dynamics will shape the trajectory of Turkmenistan–Russia relations. Domestically, Turkmenistan faces significant economic challenges and social pressures: high inflation, unemployment, and emigration are all pressing problems. These conditions may push Ashgabat to seek more external resources and investments. If Turkmenistan’s economic distress deepens, it may opt for closer economic cooperation with Russia, possibly including requests for Russian loans or investments. Indeed, assessments that Turkmenistan has drawn closer to Russia in recent years are often linked to its internal economic needs. On the other hand, if China offers increased gas purchases and greater financial support, Ashgabat is likely to continue prioritizing its relationship with Beijing. This points to a competitive and balancing game between Russia and China over influence in Turkmenistan.

In the international arena, Russia’s war in Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions have pushed Moscow to seek deeper engagement in Central Asia. For Russia, Turkmenistan has become a front in a broader geopolitical contest. The growing interest of the United States and Europe in Central Asia (new EU–Central Asia formats, US diplomatic initiatives in the region) will also affect Turkmenistan. Ashgabat will try to cautiously develop its relations with the West while avoiding a loss of trust in Moscow. For example, Turkmen gas is viewed as an important option in EU efforts to diversify energy supplies. If concrete finance and security guarantees can be offered for the Trans-Caspian pipeline, Turkmenistan may move forward on this project. In such a scenario, Russia might seek to block it on environmental or political grounds. Thus, Turkmenistan’s future energy export moves could become potential points of tension in its relations with Russia.

In the field of security, the vacuum created after the withdrawal of US/NATO forces from Afghanistan persists. While Russia aims to consolidate its role as security provider in Central Asia, Turkmenistan is inclined to cooperate de facto without formally recognizing this role. In the event of increased instability emanating from Afghanistan (such as border violations or refugee flows), Turkmenistan may be compelled to seek greater technical support from Russia. The 2020 agreement provides a framework for such cooperation, but Turkmenistan is likely to continue to act with great discretion to protect its neutral image. At the same time, if China’s security presence in the region expands (for example through bases or joint patrols in neighboring countries), this could offer Turkmenistan an alternative security anchor and encourage Ashgabat to balance Beijing and Moscow in security as well.

Overall, the future of Turkmenistan–Russia relations is likely to be characterized by gradual and cautious progress. Economically, trade and investments will probably continue to grow, and the two sides will seek new cooperation opportunities in non-energy sectors such as agriculture, textiles, and transport. Diplomatically, Turkmenistan will maintain a posture similar to that of the Non-Aligned Movement, avoiding actions that might antagonize any major power. This implies a close but carefully managed partnership with Russia. Moscow, accepting Ashgabat’s stance, will rely more on soft power instruments (education, language, culture) and economic incentives to preserve and expand its influence. The planned joint university in Ashgabat and cultural centers are part of this strategy.

It is not expected that Turkmenistan will become a full member of the EAEU or CSTO in the foreseeable future; however, it may keep the door open to partial involvement through observer status or special partnership agreements. Similarly, while Turkmenistan is interested in multinational energy projects, their implementation may be delayed by regional instability (Afghanistan) and great power rivalries (Russia–EU–China). In this case, Ashgabat will aim to optimize existing export routes via China and, to a limited extent, Russia.

In conclusion, Turkmenistan–Russia foreign policy relations are rooted in deep historical, cultural, and geographical ties and have advanced significantly in recent years. At the same time, Turkmenistan has clearly delineated the limits of this relationship within the framework of its neutrality. While the two countries continue to cooperate closely on the basis of pragmatic interests, Turkmenistan skillfully applies a policy of balance to maximize its national interests. The future trajectory of relations will be determined largely by developments in energy markets, the geopolitical climate in Central Asia, and Turkmenistan’s domestic economic situation. As long as Ashgabat manages to preserve its delicate balance among major powers, Turkmenistan–Russia relations are likely to remain based on a win–win formula, benefiting both countries and contributing to regional stability.